Countering the Military Civil Fusion (MCF) Strategy and Balancing Risks and Rewards of Emerging Technologies

Opportunity Background

Current Closing Date for Applications
Jan 29, 2021 12:00:00 AM EST

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), part of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), sponsors foreign assistance activities funded by the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account, and focuses on mitigating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons proliferation and security threats from proliferator states and non-state actors. This NOFO covers four ISN/CTR lines of effort:

• Countering the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) efforts to licitly and illicitly transfer WMD-applicable advanced and converging technologies to its military as part of its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy.
• Countering misuse of emerging technologies with potential WMD and WMD-related delivery systems applications by state and non-State actors, and leveraging emerging technologies to safeguard WMD-related data and materials.
• Enhancing the capacity of higher education institutions outside the United States to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology to proliferator states.
• Thwarting PRC exports of ballistic missiles and missile-related technology to proliferator states.

An underlying aim of all of ISN/CTR’s efforts is long-term sustainability to maximize programmatic impact while minimizing the need for foreign partners to rely on outside financial or technical assistance.

Line of Effort 1: Impeding the PRC’s MCF Strategy Related to Advanced Technologies with WMD Applications

Proliferator states, most notably the PRC, are seeking to acquire advanced technologies to gain asymmetric advantage over U.S. and other Western national military capabilities. Advanced technologies of interest include artificial intelligence (AI) and related sub-fields, biotechnology (e.g. DNA sequencers, DNA synthesizers, synthetic biology, statistical functional and microbial genetics, bioinformatics and computational biology), microprocessor/high performance computing, simulation-based inference, quantum information, and sensing, guidance and propulsion systems. There is also interest in the potential WMD-application of convergence of advanced technologies for novel WMD development or delivery, such as genetics, AI, and nanotechnology drug delivery systems.

The PRC’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has codified a program of MCF by which civilian entities (e.g., private industry, research institutions, scientists, technicians, etc.) must transfer knowledge (tangible and intangible), advanced technology, materials, and equipment to PRC military institutions such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Navy (PLAN), and Air Force (PLARF). Toward these ends, PRC entities are attempting to exploit gaps in, or the weak enforcement of, international nonproliferation regimes; obfuscate links to PRC military entities when seeking employment within or partnerships with commercial, government, and other technological entities; and procure sensitive equipment from unsuspecting or indiscriminate commercial or scientific institutions through both legal means (e.g., mergers and acquisitions, research and development collaborations, etc.) and illegal means (e.g., forced knowledge transfer (FKT), intellectual property (IP) theft, etc.).

To counter this threat, ISN/CTR aims to work with its foreign partners to enhance due-diligence efforts related to the financing, procuring, or distributing sensitive dual-use technologies; mitigate insider and outsider threats at foreign technological institutions targeted by the PRC’s MCF strategy; impede the PRC’s talent acquisition programs, strengthen research and development integrity norms to prevent FKT and IP theft, enhance information security at proliferation-sensitive technology (PST) firms, train private industry to avoid predatory joint ventures with PLA-affiliates; examine how emerging financial technologies (e.g., cryptocurrencies) can be exploited by the PLA to hide its involvement in corporate dealings; improve PST firms’ cybersecurity to defeat PLA-operated cyberattacks; investigate the CCP’s foreign direct investments into PST institutions and warn these institutions of business and reputational risks of dealing with PRC entities; and build coalitions of like-minded international science and technology researchers to take actionable measures that preserve nonproliferation norms, uphold research standards, and deny the PRC soft targets for PST acquisition via international research collaborations.

For fiscal year 2021, ISN/CTR’s priority countries for this line of effort lie in the following geographic regions, as defined by the U.S. Department of State: East Asia and Pacific (EAP), South and Central Asia (SCA), Sub-Saharan Africa (AF), Europe and Eurasia (EUR), and Western Hemisphere (WHA). Other countries or regions will be considered if a strong non-proliferation and threat reduction justification is supplied. Importantly, with extremely limited exceptions, ISN/CTR will not provide foreign assistance to developed or high-income countries (e.g., Republic of Korea).

Line of Effort 2: Countering Misuse of Emerging Technologies with Potential WMD and WMD-related Delivery Systems Applications by State and Non-State Actors, and Leveraging Emerging Technologies to Safeguard WMD-Related Data and Materials

Whether through lowering the technological barrier to developing WMD/related delivery systems, broadening the landscape of technologies that could contribute to WMD and WMD-related delivery system efforts, or by increasing security and transparency of materials, data, and transactions, emerging technologies are becoming increasingly relevant to counter-WMD threat reduction programs.

Emerging technologies of interest include, but are not limited to: internet of things (IOT), additive manufacturing (i.e. 3-D printing), certain artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning applications, robotics, automated manufacturing, cloud labs, blockchain, cryptocurrency, advanced materials, etc., particularly where they converge with biotechnology, (gene/genome editing (e.g., CRISPR/Cas9), gene sequencing), bioinformatics, surveillance, detection, and forecasting systems, and other WMD dual-use technologies and WMD-related information. ISN/CTR focuses on emerging technologies that have the potential to: 1) reduce barriers to WMD and WMD-related delivery system development, acquisition, or deployment and are not currently subject to national or international regulatory or export control regimes, or 2) safeguard WMD-applicable materials, equipment, and technologies.

Where emerging technologies converge with WMD and WMD-related delivery systems, ISN/CTR aims to counter the misuse of these technologies by preventing proliferator states and non-state actors from exploiting foreign entities developing, using, and transferring emerging technologies. ISN/CTR also aims to build foreign partner capacity to safeguard WMD-related data and materials using applicable emerging technologies (e.g., blockchain).

For fiscal year 2021, ISN/CTR’s priority countries for this line of effort have growing innovation, technology and biotechnology sectors, among others, and lie in the following geographic regions, as defined by the U.S. Department of State: East Asia and Pacific (EAP), South and Central Asia (SCA), Sub-Saharan Africa (AF), Europe and Eurasia (EUR), and the Near East (NEA). Other countries or regions, such as the Western Hemisphere (WHA), will be considered provided a strong non-proliferation and threat reduction justification is supplied. Importantly, with extremely limited exceptions, ISN/CTR will not provide foreign assistance to developed or high-income countries.

Line of Effort 3: Enhance the Capacity of Higher Education Institutions to Prevent the Transfer of Sensitive Technology to Proliferator States

Universities are often a weak link in the global defense against proliferators’ pursuit of WMD technology. For example, PLA technical officers may disguise their affiliation in order to gain admission and secure visas to study advanced technology at universities abroad as part of the PRC’s MCF strategy. The research and technological know-how these officers acquire may then be used to enhance the military and WMD capabilities of the PRC. To address this threat, ISN/CTR seeks to enhance the capacity of higher education institutions to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology to proliferator states such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, PRC, the Russian Federation, and Syria. Specifically, ISN/CTR seeks proposals for activities that will help academic institutions control access to proliferation-sensitive research and equipment, and establish processes for the comprehensive vetting of students, scholars, faculty, researchers, and beneficiaries of research grants in WMD-applicable fields. Priority countries of engagement may include but are not limited to: Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Turkey, and Ukraine. These countries have been selected based on what ISN/CTR has determined are the highest threat priorities.

Line of Effort 4: Thwarting the PRC’s Exports of Ballistic Missiles and Missile-Related Technology to Proliferator States

ISN/CTR also seeks to thwart the PRC’s prolific export of ballistic missiles and missile-related technology to proliferator states, such as DPRK, Iran, the Russia Federation, and Syria as well as partner and ally nations who are being unknowingly and involuntarily exploited through the PRC’s predatory sale practices. Specifically, ISN/CTR seeks proposals for programmatic activities that will help partner states understand the potential risk of secondary sanctions from the U.S. when they knowingly or unknowingly import or trade PRC-origin missiles or missile-related technology. In so doing, ISN/CTR seeks to 1) impede ballistic missile proliferation by states purchasing ballistic missile technology from the PRC, and 2) reduce foreign commercial revenue flowing to finance the PRC’s ballistic missile sector from unwitting third countries which are not themselves proliferator states.

Thwarting PRC exports of ballistic missiles and missile-related components is one of the Administration’s highest priorities. The PRC regularly exports missiles to malign buyers and WMD proliferator states including Iran and DPRK. While much of the PRC’s production capability remains within its borders, the export network it relies on to transfer missiles and missile-related technology includes nodes in third countries that remain exposed to U.S. sanctions risk. To counter the threat posed by PRC exports of ballistic missiles and related components, ISN/CTR seeks to deliver sanctions risk trainings for third country governments and private sector stakeholders on their vulnerability to sanctions if they wittingly or unwittingly engage in transactions associated with the sale or transfer of PRC ballistic missile-related technology and parts.

This engagement is global in scope but focuses on private sector commercial entities in countries which have historically imported ballistic missiles, missile parts, or any related technologies from PRC or PRC-subsidiaries, who may or may not understand the sanctions risk they undertake when engaging with PRC-origin products. This engagement will also target those commercial entities within these countries associated with the import of WMD and ballistic missile-related components (e.g. technology derived from mechanics and atomic, molecular, and optical physics), as well as advanced fields such as quantum mechanics, statistical thermodynamics and machine learning. Notional jurisdictions of interest include, but are not limited to: India, Serbia, and Bangladesh (the countries of greatest interest for this line of effort), as well as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, and Ukraine.

Please note: Programmatic efforts to counter China’s exports of advanced conventional weapons, as well as their related financing and logistics, are implemented by ISN/CTR’s Special Projects (SP), for which a separate NOFO is posted.

Objectives By the end of the award’s period of performance, the recipient will have successfully developed and implemented a project or projects to advance ISN/CTR’s mission by accomplishing at least one or more of the following goals toward at least one of the lines of effort outlined in this NOFO. Please indicate in your submission which LOEs the proposal addresses:

LOE 1:

• Preventing PRC acquisition of relevant technologies or technological information through forced knowledge or technology transfer;
• Providing training and capacity-building efforts to enhance due-diligence efforts by foreign entities involved in financing, procuring, or distributing sensitive dual-use technologies;
• Securing foreign technological institutions targeted by the PRC’s MCF strategy from both insider and outsider threats (e.g., through robust personnel management and cybersecurity and information security practices);
• Identifying and/or disrupting efforts by the PRC to evade international WMD and WMD-related delivery systems nonproliferation regimes through strategic investments or partnerships;
• Partnering with non-scientific interlocutors such as policymakers, law enforcement, military, and diplomatic audiences to strengthen nonproliferation regimes and norms related to advanced technologies; and
• Assessing (e.g., through open source research) and disrupting proliferator state acquisition pathways (including material transfer and financial processes) related to WMD-applicable material, dual-use equipment, or expertise.

LOE 2:

• Investigating which emerging technologies pose the greatest potential for misuse and developing targeted interventions to mitigate those risks;
• Assessing (e.g. through open research and industry knowledge) vulnerabilities in emerging technology markets and developing targeted interventions with universities, governments, and private sector including entrepreneurs, incubators, do-it-yourself biological efforts, etc. to mitigate those risks;
• Partnering with non-scientific interlocutors such as policymakers, law enforcement, military, and diplomatic audiences to strengthen nonproliferation regimes and norms related to emerging technologies;
• Engaging with inclusive and diverse foreign audiences, leveraging where possible women and minority focused technology institutions, science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), and security organizations, is encouraged but not required; and
• Leveraging interest and relationships with likeminded international partners with shared interests in providing foreign assistance to countries with emerging technology and biotechnology markets.

LOE 3:

• Instituting student, scholar, and faculty vetting programs at partner higher education institutions;
• Strengthening the ability of higher education institutions to recognize and safeguard high-risk areas of study with WMD-applications; and
• Partnering with foreign experts to raise awareness of the risk of technology transfer at higher education institutions.

LOE 4:

• Thwarting the PRC’s export of ballistic missiles and missile-related components.
• Constraining the financing of PRC ballistic missile proliferation from third country commercial customers of PRC dual-use ballistic missile technology.
• Countering PRC-origin ballistic missile proliferation by targeting countries with historic ties to the PRC which are known to have imported missiles or missile-related technologies.
• Awareness-raising for countries which may or may not understand sanctions risk associated with importing PRC-origin ballistic missile products.

Funding Priorities

ISN/CTR focuses its resources in countries facing the greatest threats from proliferator states and non-state actors with the reasonable potential (e.g., absorptive capacity, diplomatic willingness, etc.) to successfully implement WMD and related delivery systems threat reduction activities. During fiscal year 2021, ISN/CTR encourages applicants to submit proposals that advance the priority ISN/CTR lines of effort described above, and to explicitly note which specific efforts a proposed project seeks to advance. Projects engaging multiple countries through a regional approach, or are designed as a phased (not to exceed one calendar year) or iterative activity, are encouraged but not required. Recipients shall leverage relevant subject matter experts within the submitting organization or in partnership with other applicants to develop and implement projects that advance ISN/CTR’s mission.

Opportunity Structure

FEDERAL AWARD INFORMATION

Length of performance period: 12 months

Award amounts: ISN/CTR prefers projects that cost less than $300,000 though awards may involve multiple projects that cumulatively exceed $500,000. ISN/CTR will prioritize proposals that efficiently meet NOFO and programmatic goals at the lowest technically acceptable cost.

Total available funding: $11,000,000

Type of Funding: FY21/22 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Activities Funds under the Foreign Assistance Act

Anticipated project start date: October 1, 2021

Funding Instrument Type: Interagency Agreements (IAAs) and Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreements are different from grants in that bureau staff are more actively involved in the grant implementation. The CTR office will play an active role in developing and shaping the materials developed and implanted during this award. CTR will also help identify participants.

Project Performance Period: Proposed projects should be completed in 12 months or less.

This notice is subject to the availability of funding.

Competitive Scope

ELIGILIBITY INFORMATION

Eligible Applicants

The following organizations are eligible to apply (both domestic and international):

• Not-for-profit organizations
• Public and private educational institutions
• For-profit organizations
• Public International Organizations

Cost Sharing or Matching

This program does not require cost sharing, however proposals that demonstrate cost sharing will be welcomed.

The recipient is required to maintain written records to support all allowable costs that are claimed as its contribution to cost-share, as well as costs to be paid by the Federal government. Such records are subject to audit. In the event the recipient does not meet the minimum amount of cost-sharing as stipulated in the recipient’s budget, the Bureau’s contribution may be reduced in proportion to the recipient’s contribution.

Other Eligibility Requirements

In order to be eligible to receive an award, all organizations must have a unique entity identifier (Data Universal Numbering System/DUNS number from Dun & Bradstreet), as well as a valid registration on www.SAM.gov. Please see Section D.3 for information on how to obtain these registrations. Individuals are not required to have a unique entity identifier or be registered in SAM.gov.

Applicants are only allowed to submit one proposal per organization. If more than one proposal is submitted from an organization, all proposals from that institution will be considered ineligible for funding.

FEDERAL AWARDING AGENCY CONTACTS

For programmatic questions about this solicitation’s lines of effort 1 and 2, please contact:

Dr. Sapana Vora, Deputy Team Chief

Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction

U.S. Department of State

Email: [email protected]

Phone: (202) 736-7216

For programmatic questions about this solicitation’s lines of effort 3 and 4, please contact:

Ciera Dehmand, Counterproliferation Program Advisor

Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction

U.S. Department of State

Email: [email protected]

Phone: (202) 647-7872

For interagency agreement (IAA) submissions, directly submit application to the relevant program team and copy the budget team ([email protected]).

Direct any NOFO submission (non-programmatic) questions to:

Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction Management & Special Projects Team

U.S. Department of State

Email: [email protected]