Raising the Capacity of Foreign Partners to Identify and Respond to Active Measures That Undermine Nonproliferation Norms and Regimes

Opportunity Background

Current Closing Date for Applications
Jan 29, 2021 12:00:00 AM EST

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (ISN/CTR) is pleased to announce an open competition for assistance awards through this Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO). ISN/CTR sponsors foreign assistance activities funded by the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account, and focuses on mitigating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons proliferation and security threats from proliferator states and non-state actors.

Within ISN/CTR, the Special Projects (SP) Team’s Counter Russian Malign Influence (RMI) program is designed to raise the capacity of foreign partners to identify and respond to Russian active measures that undermine nonproliferation norms and regimes. Russia has a particularly notorious history of using WMD to target adversaries for assassination. This includes attempts to assassinate opposition politicians in Russia, dissidents and defectors abroad, and even citizens of other countries whose actions Russia disagrees with. The assassination attempt against Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, U.K. in 2018 was particularly notable, because it involved the first known use of a Novichok nerve agent that the Soviet Union developed in secret. And the Skripal incident is not unique. In 2020, according to chemical analysis by Germany, France, and Sweden, which was confirmed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, a Novichok agent was also used in the assassination attempt of Russian opposition leader Aleksey Navalny. Addressing such threats are a significant international security priority.

Russia also seeks to undermine longstanding nonproliferation regimes and cooperation. It has sought to disseminate disinformation and undermine the independent and effective functioning of foreign scientific laboratories in Eastern Europe. Russian active measures efforts have only become bolder during the coronavirus pandemic and now include a range of tactics such as cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns designed to directly incite people to act against public health measures.

ISN/CTR’s FY21 Counter Russian Malign Influence foreign capacity building efforts will:

• Increase countries’ ability to identify and respond to Russian active measures, including the use of hard-to-detect WMD materials in assassinations,
• Enhance international awareness of these threats to decrease Russia’s ability to conduct these actions with impunity,
• Provide a credible and effective baseline of detection and reporting for this malign behavior,
• Enhance partner capacity to strengthen nonproliferation norms in a hostile information environment,
• Provide foreign partners the ability to detect and respond to active measures campaigns that seek to undermine public health infrastructure and nonproliferation cooperation and regimes,
• Result in hardened targets against Russian malign influence to strengthen nonproliferation norms.

Program Objectives: ISN/CTR’s Special Projects Team’s Counter RMI program area will consist of three lines of effort: Counter WMD Assassination Training, Laboratory Capacity Building and Hardening, Strengthening Nonproliferation Norms.

ISN/CTR/SP Areas of Focus Related to Counter RMI:

Counter WMD Assassination Training: This area of focus will involve enhancing foreign government capacity to identify and respond to the Russian use of WMD materials in assassinations – especially in a hostile information environment. CTR will raise the technical and tactical abilities of local law enforcement, scientific, first responder, and national security stakeholders in key frontline states to identify and respond to assassination attempts where it is suspected that WMD material has been used. CTR will support efforts to enhance capacity of multi-disciplinary and inter-ministerial communities in key front line states through field training exercises (FTX) and table top training exercises (TTX). Some of these interactive TTX’s will be aimed at the strategic and political decision makers of countries, while others will be aimed at law enforcement, security services, emergency management, scientists, and policymakers with the most up-to-date scientific information. Key aspects of this training will:

• Sensitize first responder, public health, security, and policy stakeholders to the growing threat of state-sponsored dissemination of hard-to-detect WMD agents in targeted assassination attempts.
• Provide technical capabilities, including tactical exercises, to first-responders to identify potentially suspicious assassination attempts and to permit safe and secure functioning in a potentially contaminated WMD environment.
• Promote multi-disciplinary and inter-ministerial planning efforts to respond to a WMD assassination attempt.
• Train foreign partners to identify and respond effectively to a potential onslaught of disinformation campaigns seeking to undermine partner response efforts after a WMD attack.
• Promote regional, and international coordination to ensure authoritative and robust response to future WMD attacks.

Engagement countries: Europe, especially Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Cyprus. 3

Laboratory Capacity Building and Hardening: This effort will build foreign scientific capacity to interact with, and support, law enforcement and security officials to positively identify the dissemination of hard-to-detect and advanced WMD material. ISN/CTR will:

• Support forensic scientist trainers from OPCW-designated labs, and other national scientific and investigative infrastructure, to increase the ability of labs in key frontline states to test environmental and biomedical samples and identify advanced WMD materials used in assassinations.
• Host a series of international workshops and individual lab engagements to harden them against Russian active measures.
• Work with key lab and oversight officials in the health, scientific, and interior ministries to develop strong cyber and information defense capabilities.
• Provide expert advice, assistance in gap analysis, exercises, and capabilities that will allow partner labs and ministries to respond to Russian efforts to undermine the credibility these labs.

Engagement Countries: Europe/Eurasia and Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.

Strengthening Nonproliferation Norms: This program area will increase foreign government and private sector support to nonproliferation norms and regimes. ISN/CTR will:

• Engage international audiences through a variety of communications tools including publication micro grants, academic conferences, remote engagements, and others.
• Sensitize policymakers in foreign affairs, CBRN defense, nonproliferation, and foreign affairs (think tanks, journalists, professional societies) to the threat of weakened nonproliferation norms and regimes.
• Partner with local organizations to sensitize partners to the human costs of WMD proliferation by the Soviet Union and Russia.
• Use a series of electronic media, remote engagements, and follow-on discussions to provide key global audiences with timely and accurate scientific information on proliferation threats and the current state of Russian disinformation in the nonproliferation arena.
• Provide training to recognize and respond to disinformation campaigns that undermine nonproliferation regimes and norms. Previous programs have addressed disinformation related to COVID-19 for public health professionals.

Engagement Regions: Europe/Eurasia (e.g. Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asian Pacific (e.g. Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines), South and Central Asia (e.g. Kazakhstan, India, Pakistan).

Opportunity Structure

FEDERAL AWARD INFORMATION

Length of performance period: Twelve (12) Months 4

Award amounts: awards should range between $50,000 to a maximum of $500,000 per project

Total available funding: $3,500,000

Type of Funding: FY21/22 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Activities Funds under the Foreign Assistance Act.

Anticipated project start date: October 1, 2021

Funding Instrument Type: Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreements are different from grants in that bureau staff are more actively involved in the grant implementation. The CTR office will play an active role in developing and shaping the materials developed and implemented during this award. CTR will also help identify participants.

Project Performance Period: Proposed projects should be completed in 12 months or less.

This notice is subject to availability of funding.

Competitive Scope

ELIGILIBITY INFORMATION

Eligible Applicants

The following organizations are eligible to apply (both domestic and international):

• Not-for-profit organizations
• Public and private educational institutions
• For-profit organizations
• Public International Organizations

Cost Sharing or Matching

This program does not require cost sharing, however proposals that demonstrate cost sharing will be welcomed.

The recipient is required to maintain written records to support all allowable costs that are claimed as its contribution to cost-share, as well as costs to be paid by the Federal government. Such records are subject to audit. In the event the recipient does not meet the minimum amount of cost-sharing as stipulated in the recipient’s budget, the Bureau’s contribution may be reduced in proportion to the recipient’s contribution.

Other Eligibility Requirements

In order to be eligible to receive an award, all organizations must have a unique entity identifier (Data Universal Numbering System/DUNS number from Dun & Bradstreet), as well as a valid registration on www.SAM.gov. Please see Section D.3 for information on how to obtain these registrations. Individuals are not required to have a unique entity identifier or be registered in SAM.gov.

While there is no limitation on the number of projects within an overall proposal package, Applicants are only allowed to submit one proposal package per organization The only exception is if an organization has more than one DUNS number. If more than one proposal is submitted from an organization, all proposals from that institution will be considered ineligible for funding.

Applicants may submit to more than one notice of funding opportunity under ISN/CTR’s Global Threat Reduction Program.

FEDERAL AWARDING AGENCY CONTACTS 10

If you have any programmatic questions about the grant application process, please contact:

[email protected]

Direct any NOFO submission (non-programmatic) questions to:

[email protected]